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Combating Domestic Abuse in Jordan from the Top-down: Liberal and/or 
Democratic Statebuilding?  
 
This article explores the premise that liberal statebuilding often produces 
unexpected results, through an examination of Jordan’s campaign against 
domestic abuse. Over the past two decades, Jordan has become a regional leader 
in combatting domestic abuse, and its Family Protection Initiative is a prominent 
example of the executive’s implementation of externally-supported measures 
promoting women’s empowerment.  However, ambiguities over the Initiative’s 
central mission (i.e. to protect victims from re-abuse or to preserve the family 
unit) have meant that the state routinely pressures victims to reconcile with 
abusive family members. Here, I explore the context of the Initiative’s 
development and argue that it reflects regime survival strategies, designed to 
deflect international pressure for greater democratic reform, to co-opt the 
Jordanian women’s movement, and to circumvent Islamist and tribal opposition. I 
further argue that the common accusation by political opponents that the Initiative 
is ‘foreign’ is largely a veiled criticism of the executive for politically 















The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has co-operated with an array of externally-sponsored 
democracy strengthening initiatives over the past two decades. Amongst them, the promotion 
of women’s empowerment is one of the most highly publicized, and in some respects, one of 
the most productive fields, with a series of legal reforms passed to further the position of 
women in society. Despite this, Jordanian women languish near the bottom of the Global 
Gender Gap assessment overall, and rank particularly poorly in terms of economic status 
(World Economic Forum 2018).1  
There are various possible explanations for this state of affairs: that Jordan has been 
under immense socio-economic pressure during those two decades and that women have 
borne the brunt of suffering; that despite the monarchy’s best efforts, resistance to women’s 
rights by conservative Islamist and tribal forces is stymying progress; conversely, that the 
regime and/or its Western allies are not really interested in pursuing the substantive political 
reforms which are needed to underpin women’s rights because their political agenda is 
focused elsewhere. There is also the possibility that democratic statebuilding efforts related to 
women’s rights have stalled because international and domestic actors have different ideas 
about what they look like and how they should be achieved.  
Commenting on the disparity between the stated objectives of democracy promotion 
programmes in Jordan and their outcomes (i.e., reconfiguring authoritarian rule), Benjamin 
Schuetze notes that interventions often tell us more about the intervener than the environment 
that is intervened upon (Schuetze 2018: 240). He takes the case of Western aid agencies 
pursuing parliamentary strengthening measures based on a market-based ‘supply and 
demand’ logic. In an effort to depoliticise interventions, they offer technical expertise aimed 
at improving parliamentary efficiency and democratic oversight, overlooking the actual logic 
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of power pertaining to the Jordanian parliament (as a patronage provider and a democratic 
façade) and thereby further contributing towards authoritarian upgrading.  Schuetze relates 
his enquiry to a 2013 study by Meera Sabaratnam, which analyses how assumptions of 
Eurocentric distinctiveness and superiority are reified even by postcolonial critics of liberal 
peacebuilding because they cannot break free of the colonising ontologies of Western 
political theories. She argues that Eurocentricism emerges even in critical peacebuilding 
studies that ignore the perspectives of the recipient population, or assume that they are 
passive recipients of the logics and/or material effects of intervention. She also notes a 
tendency in critiques of the liberal peace to assume ‘an ontology of cultural ‘Otherness’ via 
the ‘liberal’/’local’ divide (Sabaratnam 2013: 263). Sabaratnam acknowledges the difficulties 
of avoiding the ‘trap’ of Eurocentric assumptions but suggests that observing certain methods 
of enquiry can help to decolonize the study of intervention.  
Like other postcolonial critiques, Sabaratnam’s argument is open to the accusation of 
being ultimately anti-foundational, and here I take a more sympathetic view of the dilemmas 
facing statebuilders in their pursuit of the elusive common good. In framing my analysis of 
Jordan around the normatively charged concept of the ‘hybrid regime’, I do not pretend to 
free myself entirely of Eurocentric thought. Moreover, unlike many assessments of Arab 
governance, I do not assume that the Jordanian monarchy’s bids to strengthen women’s 
position of in society are disingenuous. But Sabaratnam’s study provides a useful lens 
through which to observe how a ‘postcolonial encounter’ (Sajed 2013) between the 
intervenors and the intervened upon is instantiated in Jordan. Rather than focusing 
exclusively or even primarily on the objectives of external statebuilding actors (an approach 
which inevitably side-lines the agency of domestic actors), I shift the lens towards the context 
of intervention. This shift necessitates consideration of the perspectives of aid ‘beneficiaries’ 
(whether implementing partners, political critics or the ‘objects’ of intervention) and breaks 
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down perceived dichotomies between liberal Western statebuilders and reactionary Eastern 
societies, shedding light on how intervention takes shape and often produces unexpected 
outcomes.   
The paper investigates a particular sphere of statebuilding in the Kingdom, the 
empowerment of women. Frequently presented as a cornerstone of liberal democratic 
statebuilding, gender equality is also broadly recognised as a sphere in which cultural 
‘Otherness’ prevents possibilities for meaningful cooperative reform. At the same time, 
however, ‘hybrid’ regimes such as Jordan are often willing to promote aspects of women’s 
rights precisely because they do not shake the foundations of their rule (Tripp 2013; David & 
Nanes 2011). One particular area of women’s empowerment in Jordan which has resulted in 
an ambiguous, and arguably undesirable outcome for statebuilders is the campaign to combat 
domestic abuse which dates to the late 1990s. Far from being passive or unwilling recipients 
of intervention, the monarchy has fronted the campaign. Jordan has undertaken a series of 
measures within the auspices of the Family Protection (Himayat al-Usra) Initiative to reduce 
violence against women and children in the home. These include public outreach campaigns, 
the provision of legal advice, counselling, medical and protection services to victims, and 
legal reforms to increase punishments that can levied on perpetrators. These varied initiatives 
have drawn in external and Jordanian state, non-state and semi-state actors whose overall 
impact on society is multi-dimensional and complex. Nonetheless, the emphasis of the state-
driven campaign on preserving the family unit has arguably led to an ambiguous legal 
situation in which victims who seek help from the police Family Protection (FPD) 
Department are routinely pressured into being ‘reconciled’ with abusive family members. 
This raises questions about whether the initiative’s ‘real’ objective is to protect the family, or 
to protect the family name.  
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The paper seeks to understand the guiding influences in the Family Protection 
campaign, and whether resistance to it has primarily been a result of an East/West ‘clash of 
cultures’, as it is often characterized by those who oppose it – and, indeed, by some who 
support it. I argue that the campaign has highlighted normative confrontations, but that these 
cannot be reduced to liberal individualism versus conservative Islamism, or to an East versus 
West dichotomy. Nor can they be reduced to an overarching binary between the international 
and the (much touted) ‘local’ (Ginty 2011; vs, Hirblinger & Simmons 2015). In important 
respects, clashes reflect domestic political trends. Notwithstanding international development 
agencies’ involvement in the campaign, its impetus and design (which in many respects is 
paternalistic) has been shaped primarily by the monarchy. The campaign’s trajectory reflects 
the monarchy’s bid to co-opt women rights’ groups and causes on the one hand, and to 
circumvent opposition from tribal and Islamist factions on the other. International 
development agencies perpetuate this dynamic by supporting top-down reform.  
The paper’s assessments rely on a combination of oral testimonies, policy memoranda 
and legal provisions. On the one hand, I refer to publications issued by international 
development agencies. On the other, I draw on semi-structured qualitative interviews 
conducted in person in Jordan and by telephone between 2011 and 2018. Interviewees 
included the director and an external relations representative of FPD; the lead coordinator 
with the FPD from the Ministry of Social Affairs; a spokesperson for the Jordanian National 
Centre for Human Rights; three spokespeople at the National Council for Family Affairs 
(NCFA); over a dozen publically recognized tribal ‘elders’, a spokesperson for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a British diplomat and former consultant who were involved in setting up the 
FPD; and the Presidents of Mizan Law Group for Human Rights, the Jordan Society for 
Protecting Family Violence Victims (JSPFVV), Sisterhood is Global (SIGI) Jordan; and a 
legal counsellor for the Jordan Women’s Union (JWU). I also draw on interviews conducted 
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with over 30 Jordanian women, including several who acknowledged they had been victims 
of domestic abuse, from different socio-economic backgrounds across Jordan, whose views I 
sought in my broader research into the role of the Jordanian police in dispute resolution 
processes. Where interviewees are identified it is because they consented for them to be used 
in academic research on combating domestic abuse. It should, however, go without saying 
that my assessments here do not necessarily reflect the views of my interviewees.   
The discussion unfolds in four parts.  The first assesses the problems associated with 
liberal statebuilding models which have attempted to incorporate gender empowerment into 
interventions from above. Recognising the centrality of the Jordanian monarchy in leading 
the campaign against domestic abuse, the second part shifts to the domestic outlook by 
situating Jordan’s pursuit of liberal reforms and particularly the promulgation of women’s 
rights post-1989 in the literature on hybrid and aid-dependent regimes. Part three explores the 
trajectory of the Family Protection Initiative from 1997 and specifically the FPD’s remit. The 
final part assesses how the relationship between the main stakeholders (the regime, Jordanian 
women’s groups, and international development agencies) has shaped the campaign’s focus 
on reconciling victims with their families, and suggests that opposition voiced by tribal 
figures and Islamists reflects contestation over societal norms but also political priorities.  
 
Women’s Empowerment as a Cornerstone of Liberal Statebuilding 
 
Calls for worldwide gender equality have been evident in the United Nations’ agenda since 
the 1970s. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) – an international bill of rights for 
women that defines discrimination and sets up an agenda for national action to end it. The 
implementation of CEDAW in the Global South became increasingly relevant from the 1990s 
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amidst a climate of liberal interventionism by Western and multilateral development 
agencies. In 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 called for ‘women’s equal 
participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace 
and security’. And in 2011, international partners in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
States declared that ‘The empowerment of women … is at the heart of successful 
peacebuilding and statebuilding.’ While early formulations of statebuilding focused on 
‘failed’ states, whereas peacebuilding focused more narrowly on post-conflict states, both 
terms were increasingly applied to measures taken in more broadly construed ‘fragile states’, 
including a number whose central governmental structures remained intact (e.g. Grävingholt, 
Gänzle, and Ziaja 2009; Chandler 2010). Development agencies including the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) have 
subsequently sought to highlight how gender could be ‘mainstreamed’ into all statebuilding 
activities (e.g. OECD 2013; Domingo & Holmes 2013).  
Yet, the pursuit of gender equality is one of the most problematic components of the 
liberal peace agenda. Mark Duffield describes this agenda as: 
 
…a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, 
reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and 
security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy. In many respects, while contested and far 
from assured, liberal peace reflects a radical developmental agenda of social transformation (Duffield 2001: 10-
11).  
 
In fact, as Hutchings argues, liberal internationalism has become associated with principles 
and practices that are frequently in tension with one another: human rights and rights to 
national self-determination, neoliberal markets and commitments to development aid, state 
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sovereignty and responsibility to protect (Hutchings 2013: 160). And yet, at ‘the heart of any 
position that calls itself liberal [is] the valorisation of individual freedom’ (Ibid).  
This apparent commitment to individualism is frequently conceived as the source of 
enduring tension between atomistic ‘Western’ and ‘Other’ cultures, and whether gender 
equality is particular to liberal democracy or a fundamental feature of any democracy is 
disputed. ‘Are emancipation, equality, and rights part of a universal language we must use?’ 
asks Lila Abu Lughod rhetorically (2002: 788).  In the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), most states have signed CEDAW but applied reservations to several clauses. 
Religious arguments (and especially Quranic verses 2:228, and 4:434), are commonly cited as 
grounds for treating men and women unequally, particularly within the context of marriage. 
This was, for instance, very apparent in Jordan in 2003 when Islamist members of parliament 
blocked proposed amendments to personal status law, citing the amendments’ incompatibility 
with the Shari’a (Clark & Young 2008: 347-348).  
Arab women’s rights activists, most of whom identify as Muslim, argue that these 
verses can be interpreted as a comment of their time (i.e. 1,500 years ago) as opposed to a 
prescriptive dictate; and that Islam is being exploited by authoritarian rulers and influential 
societal figures as a pretext to justify patriarchal norms (e.g. Chaudhry 2016: 23). The fact 
that women’s rights are more established in several less patriarchal non-Arab Muslim 
countries appears to support this argument. Even so, repeated public polling across the Arab 
world indicates that while the large majority favour democratic governance, they are less 
categorical about gender equality. The 2017-2018 Arab Opinion index indicated that 76 
percent of Arabs believed democracy was the most appropriate system of government. But a 
2012 Gallup poll across six Arab countries indicated that while 75 percent of men and 
women agreed they should have equal legal rights, slightly less than 50 percent believed that 
women should be equally entitled to initiate a divorce. A 2017 Promundo/UN Women poll in 
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Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine indicated that 74 percent of men and women 
believed that men should have the final say within the home and over 80 percent believed that 
women should tolerate violence in order to keep the family together (Promundo/UN Women 
2017: 47).  
Different attitudes towards the role of women in society, then, cannot be dismissed as 
barriers to introducing measures that ‘empower’ women, in the Western sense. But the 
premise of ‘Otherness’ can also be used to distract from the fact that Western-centric 
statebuilding measures in the Middle East are predominantly framed as top-down 
interventions which, in many cases, are reframed and/or manipulated by undemocratic elites 
to serve domestic objectives. Although Western development agencies rhetorically embrace 
the merits of working with civil society as means of promoting democracy from the bottom-
up, they have narrowly construed civil society as non-governmental organisations, which in 
the MENA context are normally under the control of the executive (e.g. Jad 2003). In a 
damning appraisal of Western intervention in the Muslim world (‘Do Muslim women Really 
Need Saving?), Abu Lughod highlights the Western preoccupation with understanding the 
‘culture’ of the Middle East, and particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women, as 
opposed to understanding the history of repressive regimes and the role of the US in the 
region (Abu Lughod 2002: 784). She suggests that during the US campaign to liberate 
Afghan women from the Taliban in 2001, the degree of sympathy expressed by American 
and European women for Afghan women was based on a sense of pity and smug superiority 
that Western women felt for ‘oppressed Muslim women’ (Abu Lughod 2002: 787). 
Elsewhere, she argues that Western pressure on Muslim governments to improve the status of 
women could be undermining the local legitimacy of feminist causes (Abu Lughod 2013). In 
a similar vein, Sheila Carapico’s chapter on ‘Patronizing Women’ picks up on ‘a phrase 
bantered among bilingual development professionals about being “caught between the 
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paternalism of Arab men and the patronizing of Western feminists”’ (Carapico 2015: 113). 
Carapico highlights the Orientalist tendencies of post-colonial aid implementers to repeat 
‘stock phrases like ‘patriarchal culture’ that are not investigated empirically so much as 
‘known in advance’ to characterise native pathologies’ with no western analogies (Ibid: 115).  
Both critiques resonate in Jordan’s campaign against domestic abuse. On the one 
hand, Western statebuilding interventions have indeed been advocated in terms of the 
supposedly universal values of liberal individualist humanitarianism, and have equally been 
denounced by political Islamists and tribal figures who argue that they do not cohere with 
Islamic law or with Jordanian values. My own empirical investigations into the campaign 
suggest that patriarchal norms are a major barrier to societal acceptance of state intervention 
into the family sphere. On the other hand, however, the executive’s firm control over most 
domestic NGOs, coupled with the Western (particularly US) prioritisation of geostrategic 
concerns and fear of political Islam, have led to external promotion of women’s rights being 
primarily channelled through the monarchy and thereby shaped by its survival strategies. This 
in turn has alienated opposition voices, who have arguably used hostility to ‘foreign 
interference’ as a pretext for resisting an initiative which reinforces the authority of the 
regime at their expense.  
 
Jordan in Perspective: Women’s Rights under Hybrid and Aid Dependent Regimes  
 
Regime Hybridity & State Sponsored Feminism 
 
Jordan’s history of grassroots women’s activism dates back to the establishment of the Jordan 
Women’s Union (JWU) in the mid-1940s. Even so, the executive has long constrained non-
governmental organisations including women’s groups, and, with international 
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encouragement, has fronted or co-opted most initiatives promoting women. In this light, a 
discussion of women’s rights in Jordan needs to be prefaced with an account of regime 
hybridity, aid-dependency, and the geo-strategic prerogatives of donors.    
Hybrid regimes are ‘ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal 
democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions and respect for a limited 
sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits’ 
(Ottaway 2003). While some see them as transitioning towards fully functioning 
democracies, others take them to be using the trappings of democracy as survival strategies to 
upgrade authoritarian rule (Brumberg 2002; Heydeman 2007; Brownlee 2009). In the 
MENA, regimes including Morocco, Kuwait, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan took a series of 
liberalising measures in the early 1990s (e.g. Ehteshami 1999; Anderson 2001). In addition to 
economic reforms, these included extending freedom of speech and assembly, legalising 
political parties and holding legislative elections. But in every case, rulers retained control 
over the executive and legislative process. By the late 1990s, ‘it became evident that few of 
these processes would live up to their promises, as openings were reversed or manipulated in 
ways that made talk of progress toward democracy ridiculous’ (Ryan & Schwedler 2003: 
140). Renewed optimism that the 2010/2011 Arab Uprisings would compel regimes to 
redress social contracts with citizens was short-lived as moves to enhance civil liberties, 
reform electoral and constitutional laws were broadly dismissed as superficial (Heydemann 
2012; Aziz 2017).  
State-sponsored feminist policies are common in hybrid regimes (Errazzouki & Al-
Khawaja 2013; Wilde et. al. 2018). They often include introducing women’s quota seats in 
elections; securing women better access to education; promoting women’s associations to 
operate as core components of civil society (which is broadly controlled by the state in any 
case); or raising the profile of select women in public life (Muriaas, Tonnessen & Wang 
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2013; Tripp 2015). Lorch & Bunk argue that authoritarian state feminist policies fall into 
three survival strategies: legitimation (i.e. improving the regime’s own image in the eyes of 
its public and/or the outside world); co-optation (supporting women’s causes to win votes or 
moral support); and a form of divide-and-rule whereby secular women’s rights groups are 
played off against Islamist groups (Lorch & Bunk 2016: 6). The latter strategy is evident in 
several MENA countries, where regimes have promoted women in some spheres but retained 
conservative personal status and inheritance laws which discriminate strongly against women 
(Al-Ali 2002: 9; Salhi 2010).  
 
Aid Dependency & Democratic Reform 
 
As to the extent of international influence on reform, external actors logically have greater 
leverage over gender policies in states which depend on their aid. In the 1990s, Western 
states began trying to link aid directly to democracy promotion in ‘fragile’ states. US 
democracy promotion peaked during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and in 2006, 
Condoleeza Rice announced the State Department’s initiative to link aid to ‘transformational 
diplomacy’ aimed at bringing about sustainable democracy abroad (Rice 2006). The prospect 
of Western development aid has indeed motivated pro-women reforms in some states (Adams 
2007; David & Nanes 2011; Tripp 2013). However, the effects of democracy strengthening 
aid are often obscured by bilateral military assistance. Where recipient regimes have 
particular geo-strategic value as allies – as is the case with Jordan - democratisation attempts 
are confined to less politically sensitive initiatives, such as offering technical expertise to 
members of parliament or human rights training to security agencies, and statebuilding efforts 
have been predominantly channelled through the regime as opposed to grassroots agencies.  
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In Jordan, aid dependency and regime hybridity have gone hand-in-hand since the 
1989 economic collapse. The Kingdom’s foreign policy has historically sought to maximise 
external aid and investment (Brand 1995). Since gaining independence from Britain in 1946, 
and notwithstanding several diplomatic hiccups, the executive has capitalized on its role as a 
vital strategic ally to the US, European states, and the Arab Gulf to attract foreign grants and 
investment. Even at the height of the oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s when the economy was 
buoyed by remittances sent by nationals working in the Gulf, aid was a staple source of 
income. After the oil price collapse in 1986, the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank, and the UN became increasingly important in this regard. In 1989, the 
executive appealed to the IMF to bail the economy out. In return, the IMF demanded cuts in 
government spending and fiscal reforms to increase domestic revenue. The subsequent 
political opening up (Infitah), during which martial law was lifted, political parties legalised, 
and legislative elections held reflected the government’s recognition that imposing fiscal 
austerity required some compensatory civil rights concessions (Brand 1992; Brynen 1992).  
A public backlash against Jordan’s 1994 peace agreement with Israel is credited with 
halting liberalisation under King Hussein (Brand 1999). On accession in 1999, King 
Abdullah II adopted the role of moderniser, and throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 
signalled enthusiasm for democratic reform (at least to Western audiences). Onlookers 
questioned whether the country was headed towards democratic government. Some noted that 
the Royal Court had deliberately undermined grassroots movements by co-opting civil 
society (Brand 1999; Wiktorowtz 2000; Nanes 2003). Others dismissed the significance of 
elections, pointing to the regime’s successive gerrymandering of electoral constituencies, and 
to the fact that members of parliament exercised no substantive power. Rather, the purpose of 
elections was to provide a basis for the distribution of patronage (Lucas 2003; Lust, Hourani, 
& El-Momani 2011).  
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A defining feature of Hashemite rule has been its patronage of the ‘native’ 
Transjordanian population. Tensions between Transjordanians and Palestinians who came to 
the country after the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars crystallised in the late 1960s and the 
Palestinian-Jordanian population has been marginalised from the public sector. Post-1989, 
successive changes to parliamentary electoral rules have disproportionately favoured loyalist 
tribal heartlands at the expense of large urban centres where Palestinian-Jordanians are 
concentrated. Political parties are weak, with the exception of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) 
(the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, which has a strong Palestinian-Jordanian support 
base), and the vast majority of parliamentary representatives are independents. Under King 
Hussein, the Brotherhood acted as the ‘loyal opposition’. However, Abduallah’s relations 
with the Brotherhood have deteriorated since 2005 and the executive has used the threat of 
Islamist political gains to deter donors from pressing for radical political reform. In 2013, the 
executive outlawed the Brotherhood’s dominant ‘hawk’ wing, granting a licence instead to a 
more compliant offshoot (‘dove’) group.  
Royal patronage has been inconsistent. Some East Bankers have enjoyed considerably 
greater favour than others over the years, but not all Palestinians have been excluded (e.g. 
Greenwood 2003; Peters & Moore 2015). Increasingly under Abdullah, patterns of patronage 
have given way to neo-liberal economic reforms which have alienated large segments of the 
Transjordanian support base by cutting public sector employment, commodity subsidies and 
welfare perks, concentrating them instead in the hands of the military and their dependents 
(Baylouny 2008). Disgruntled East Bankers, as well pro-Islamist Palestinian-Jordanians, were 
amongst the most persistent protestors against corruption, socio-economic injustice and 
claimants of political reform during the Arab Spring protests in 2011-12 (Yom 2014).  
The King responded to mass demonstrations in 2011 by sacking the government and 
promising extensive reforms. Various measures were subsequently introduced: over 40 
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constitutional amendments were passed; a new electoral law increased parliamentary seats 
from 120 to 150, of which 18 percent were to be elected through countrywide party lists; and 
the King promised to appoint prime ministers in consultation with parliament. These 
measures scarcely diminished overall royal control. Moreover, the government incrementally 
curtailed freedom of expression, for instance with the 2012 Press and Publications Law, 
which attempted to silence websites that criticised the government, and further restricted 
NGO autonomy in 2015 by requiring that they obtain governmental approval before receiving 
foreign funding. The executive indicated that much as it favoured democratic process, the 
people were unprepared for wholescale democracy and needed to be guided from above King 
Abdullah 2013; Al-Samadi 2013; Charbel 2014; Martinez 2017).  
Jordan’s external benefactors have broadly accepted the argument of political 
immaturity. USAID sees Jordan as ‘a voice for moderation, peace and reform in the Middle 
East’ whose internal collapse is unconscionable (USAID Jordan 2019). Jordan’s assistance to 
the US regional war on terror, its willingness to host several million Iraqi and Syrian 
refugees, and to cooperate with Israel make it a vital strategic ally. Jordan has become the 
third largest global recipient of US aid after Afghanistan and Israel. Between 2015 and 2017 
it was allocated $1 billion in annual US bilateral economic assistance (Sharp 2017: 13), and 
was excluded from US budgetary cuts to the MENA in 2018. Even at the height of liberal 
interventionism, democracy promotion came a distant second to boosting the state’s military 
capabilities: between 2004 and 2007, USAID’s democracy and governance assistance 
accounted for only 4% of total US development assistance to Jordan (Peters & Moore 2009: 
279). Even so, Jordan receives far more ‘pro-democracy’ funding than other MENA states. 
The US government spent $88.2 million on democracy and human rights programmes in 
Jordan between 2013 and 2015 alone; nearly $10 million more than on similar programmes in 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen combined (McInerney & Bockenfeld 2017).  
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Hashemite Patronage of Women’s Rights 
 
Hashemite policies on women’s empowerment have been amongst the most obvious markers 
of political liberalisation and have been eagerly supported by international development 
agencies.  In the 1990s, Queen Noor became a figurehead for women’s and children’s rights. 
Princess Basma bint Talal and the current Queen (Rania) have latterly adopted the cause.  
Jordan has signed several international rights conventions and taken steps to bring 
domestic laws into conformity with those conventions. In 1992, Princess Basma set up the 
Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) with the purpose of:  
 
...mainstreaming... a gender-equality perspective in all policy areas and narrowing the gap between formal 
acknowledgement of women’s rights as detailed by legislation and actual societal attitudes towards women 
(JNCW 1992).  
 
The government ratified CEDAW the same year, albeit with reservations on Articles 
pertaining to women’s rights within the family on the grounds that they contravened the 
Jordan’s Personal Status Laws which are based on Sharia.  
Since Abdullah’s accession, the monarchy has advocated several amendments to the 
Criminal Code and Personal Status Laws. Some have been ratified: in 2002, for instance the 
government raised the minimum marriage age to 18 for men and women from 16 and 15 
respectively (albeit with mitigating conditions). In 2017, parliament finally voted to abolish 
the law exempting rapists if they married their victims. Other proposals (for instance, 
pertaining to women’s rights to initiate divorce and to claim compensation) have been 
repeatedly rejected by both ‘Islamist’ and ‘tribal’ components of the Lower House (Clark & 
Young 2008). Indeed, this is one of the few areas in which parliament has effectively 
thwarted the executive, which has resorted to introducing reforms via temporary laws which 
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do not require parliamentary ratification. Proposals to amend Articles 340 and 98 of the 
Criminal Code, which reduce the punishment for men who kill or attack female relatives who 
commit adultery, have also been rejected by the Lower House despite royal backing. MPs 
argued variously that the proposed amendment was evidence of foreign influences attempting 
to interfere in Jordanian society, and that cancelling the law would contribute towards the 
moral decay of Jordan’s traditional and ‘religious’ society (Nanes 2003: 125). 
Politically, in keeping with the Millenium Development Goal, in 2003 Jordan 
reserved six seats in parliament for women, rising to 12 in 2010, and to 15 in 2013. In 2007, a 
20 percent threshold was guaranteed for women in the municipal elections, rising to 25 
percent in 2011. The practical impact of these reforms is unclear. Arguably, granting women 
a parliamentary quota does not amount to politically empowering women when parliament 
has little power. Rather, it is a means of incorporating a select few women into the 
parliamentary patronage system (e.g. David & Nanes 211). At the municipal level, small 
tribes can achieve big gains by strategically nominating women members to stand, even if 
they have no intention of using their seats to promote women’s causes (Bush & Gao 2017).  
What is clear is that women’s position trails that of men in several respects, and 
particularly with regard to income. Despite having amongst the best levels of education in the 
MENA and higher rates of university attendance than men, only around eight percent of 
women are employed, with a further seven percent seeking employment. Private sector 
companies often circumvent obligations to offer paid maternity leave and day-care for 
working mothers (Freedom House 2016). Jordanian inheritance laws, in keeping with Shari’a, 
stipulate than women are entitled half the inheritance that their brothers receive, but 
according to Freedom House, women are often denied access to even this share by male 
relatives (Ibid 2017). Moreover, in 2017 alone, over 1,100 women victims of domestic 
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violence and/or at risk of being the targets of ‘honour crimes’ were being held indefinitely in 
prisons under administrative detention for their own ‘protection’ (Jordan Times 2017).  
 
The Story of Jordan’s Family Protection Initiative  
 
Origins and Effectiveness of the Campaign 
Domestic abuse against women – defined as physical, sexual and psychological violence by 
any family member - is prevalent in Jordan. Data is admittedly scarce due to definitional 
discrepancies, under-reporting and the lack of a coordinated national database. However, 
public polling has produced indicative findings. In 2009, research by Clark et al. suggested 
that almost a third of married women had suffered from intimate partner physical violence, 
and almost 19 percent from sexual violence. A 2012 national representative survey by the 
Demographic and Health Study (DHS) of 11,352 ever-married women aged 15-49 across 
indicated that 32 percent had experienced emotional, physical, and/or sexual violence from 
their spouse, and 22 percent reported having experienced one or more forms of violence in 
the past 12 months (DHS 2013: 199).2  
Petitions for enhanced legal and practical protection measures for victims of domestic 
violence in Jordan have proliferated over the past 30 years. The Jordanian Criminal Code 
does not explicitly refer to domestic violence, although provisions within it can be invoked to 
prosecute sex attacks and ‘immoral advances’, serious cases of assault and exploitation.  In 
2010, amendments to the Criminal Code increased penalties for rape, molestation, and 
homicide, but the Code omits mention of violence (including rape) committed by a man 
against his wife. Criminal courts require plaintiffs to produce two witnesses in order to rule 
on wife battery. The principle sources of legislation relating specifically to domestic abuse 
are the 2008 and 2017 Laws on Protection from Domestic Violence discussed below.  
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Practical state-led measures to combat abuse began with the establishment of the 
Family Protection Unit (later transformed into a Department – the FPD) as a branch of the 
Public Security Directorate (police, or PSD) in 1997. The trigger for developing this unit 
seems not to have been domestic abuse, but rather a rape case of British/Iraqi woman by a 
stranger the following year. A British employee of Prince Hassan (then Crown Prince), took 
the issue to the British Embassy (with Hassan’s approval). As a result, several British police 
officers were sent to Jordan to run a course for the Jordanian police on how to deal with 
sexual crimes. Interest grew in establishing a unit modelled on the Child Protection and 
Domestic Violence Units run by Social Services in the UK. In 1999, UK DFID invested 
£2,500,000 into a ‘Family Protection Programme’, a holistic initiative drawing in the police 
but also the Ministries of Justice, Social Development, Health, and a number of independent 
experts and NGOs.3 The participants were initially divided into task-force committees, 
focusing on legal or medical issues or public relations etc.4 
While the FPD is directed by the police, it is also staffed by social workers from the 
Ministry of Social Development, medics, psychologists and members of the Jordan River 
Foundation (a Royal NGO set up by Queen Rania). Since 2007, the Ministry has run the Dar 
Al-Wefaq al-Osari shelter in Amman for the worst abuse cases, with capacity to 
accommodate 50 women with 36 accompanying children. In 2015 it opened an additional 
government shelter in Irbid able to accommodate 25 women and up to 12 children.  
The FPD’s reach and remit has increased incrementally. Initially restricted to Amman, 
the department now has branches in all provinces barring Ma’an. The FPD deals with walk-
ins and referrals as well as manning a national complaint hotline, and handles offences 
categorized as legal violations (mukhalafat) involving minor injuries, and also more serious 
criminal felonies (janayat) that result in incapacity for over ten days. While felonies must be 
referred directly to the public prosecutor, the FPD can take several incremental steps with 
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respect to violations. After an initial report of the incident has been generated, an 
investigation is launched, along with a physical examination of the victim if necessary, 
followed by a social follow-up and reconciliation process. On a plaintiff’s request, the FPD 
can transfer cases to the courts for prosecution, and where victims are deemed to be at 
continued risk, it can refer them to government shelters.  The FPD also runs preventative 
outreach programmes which include delivering educational lectures in schools and training 
district police in ‘basic family protection skills’ so they can recognize abuse cases and refer 
them to the FPD (Interview with FPD spokesperson for external relations, April 2012).  
Several Jordanian NGOs work closely with government agencies as part of the Family 
Protection Initiative. The Jordan River Foundation (JRF, established 1995) seconds 
employees to the FPD and since 2000 has run a shelter in Amman for up to 32 child abuse 
victims. Mizan Law Group for Human Rights (established 1998), provides legal aid to 
women referred to it by the FPD, and equally refers cases requiring heightened protection to 
the FPD. The two organizations co-ordinate to train agencies on family protection skills. Rim 
Abu Hassan, the ex-President of the JSPFVV (established 1998), who became Minister of 
Social Development between 2013 and 2017, indicated that her charity had a strong working 
relationship with the FPD based on mutual trust between individuals in both organizations.  
The oldest women’s society in Jordan - the Jordan Women’s Union (JWU), originally 
founded in 1945, has a more contentious relationship with the FPD but its shelter for abused 
women sometimes takes referrals from the police.   
In 2008, the legislature passed the Protection from Domestic Violence Law. The law 
covered the practice of dealing with domestic abuse, specifying actions to be taken by the 
FPD, medical professionals, the Ministry of Social Development, courts, etc, and 
punishments that could be prescribed. It also stipulated that with the agreement of the victim 
and alleged abuser, the Minister of Social Development was empowered to recommend the 
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formation of a multidisciplinary Family Reconciliation Committee charged with reconciling 
family members in cases of violations and thus averting the need for court proceedings. The 
reconciliation committees never materialized because the procedure for convening them was 
unclear and authorized the police to dismiss cases that only the public prosecution is 
empowered to dismiss. An amended law was passed in May 2017, stipulating further possible 
punishments courts could apply and providing more detail on protective measures for victims 
and other family members.  The law abolished the notional reconciliation committees, but 
stipulated that minor offenses (which it refers to as ‘disputes’ rather than crimes) should 
initially be resolved through a settlement process organized by the FPD, who would pass 
details of the settlement to the court to ratify or amend ‘if necessary’. 
In practice, the majority of cases are categorized as minor on the basis that they do not 
cause incapacity for over 10 days. As a result, victims are often pressured to agree to being 
‘reconciled’ with abusive family members. While the Criminal Code enables women to sue 
for compensation from their abusers, and divorce laws now stipulate domestic violence as 
grounds for divorce, the overall institutionalised emphasis on reconciliation reflects rather 
than challenges underlying societal norms about women’s obligations to their husbands, 
fathers and brothers. Lack of public data makes it impossible to judge whether pro-
reconciliation counselling and mediation services are in fact reducing re-abuse rates, or 
actually making the situation worse for victims, as some of my interviewees suggested.   
 
Uptake of Services by Jordanian Women 
 
Statistics released by the FPD in recent years suggest that more Jordanian women are taking 
complaints to the department.5 But the numbers are still small, and smaller still as a 
percentage of the expanding population. A 2016 UN Women report indicated that only 3 
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percent of women would seek police help if subjected to domestic abuse (UN Women 2016). 
While there is no consolidated database recording instances of abuse reported to different 
agencies, NGO representatives I spoke with suggested that a larger percentage seek help from 
civil society organisations, but that friends and other family members remain the main and 
usually only source of support.  
My interviews with women in different parts of the country from varied socio-
economic backgrounds, whilst admittedly only comprising a scant sample, indicated that 
victims of domestic abuse believed it preferable to keep the issue to themselves. Although the 
sample size was insufficient to conjecture about the relative effect of wealth on women’s 
choices in this regard, Jordanian NGO interviewees indicated that in their experience, women 
of independent means tended to be more assertive with the FPD about insisting on pursuing 
their legal rights, often because they were better equipped to cope with their husbands being 
financially penalised, or indeed to cope without their husbands’ income. Conversely, one 
young women in Jebel Al-Nadhif, a poor, overcrowded, quarter of Amman, told me ‘the 
losses [involved in reporting abuse] are greater than the gains’. Inhibiting factors cited 
included insufficient knowledge of the procedures and insufficient confidence in the 
sympathy, efficacy and/or discretion of the police. One disenchanted former member of the 
FPD commented on the agency’s inability to address the real problems women face at the 
hands of their abusers, saying that all the department did was to write reports on the cases, 
call the women’s husbands, and ‘tell them to be nice’.  By far the most prominent factor, 
however, was the underlying lack of societal support and fear of retribution from family 
members. The same, former FPD employee said: 
 
Most of the women who came to us wanted it to be in secret. Because people will look and point and talk about 
them if they know they have been there…. and many of them are actually punished by their brothers or 




Members of victims’ tribes have occasionally attempted to break into the Wefaq shelter, 
prompting local governors to send women at risk of further abuse to prison for their own 
protection (Interview with former employee of Prince Hassan, April 2011). And according to 
Jordanian NGOs who offer legal advice to victims, few of the women who do take 
complaints to the FPD seek prosecution. From a practical perspective, women gain nothing 
from fines levied by the state on their husbands, and indeed suffer doubly when the husband 
is the family’s main source of income.  Moreover, many cannot afford the expense of a court 
case. In the same way that they distrust the police, victims often lack faith in the justice 
system. More importantly, court cases require women to give detailed accounts of sensitive 
personal information and to publicly confront their abusers, who often bring family members 
for moral support. As a consequence, most cases handled by the FPD are settled ‘amicably’ 
without reaching court, reinforcing the state (and predominant NGO) narrative that their 
central mission is to protect the integrity of the family unit.   
 
Assessing Agendas, Outcomes & Opposition to the Campaign 
 
…assaults on and abuses of children are prohibited, as well as any form of violence against women... (King 




To appreciate how the FPD’s role has developed as a part of the broader campaign, we need 
to consider how the main stakeholders (who can broadly be summarised as international 
development agencies, Jordanian women’s groups, and the executive) have interacted, and 
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how the main opposition voices (who can broadly be described as tribal figures and Islamists) 
have reacted.  
Aside from DFID’s initial role in setting up the initiative, numerous international 
development organisations including UN agencies, the EU, USAID, the World Bank, and the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice, have contributed to the Initiative. On the one 
hand, they have urged Jordan to sign international rights conventions such as CEDAW, 
advocated domestic legal reforms; and monitored their enforcement. On the other, they have 
provided technical assistance and training to both government agencies and Jordanian NGOs 
to offer particular services to victims and to run public awareness raising campaigns.  
Most external governmental agencies have attempted to work with both the Jordanian 
authorities and non-state entities, whereas international NGOs target interventions 
predominantly (although not exclusively) through domestic NGOs. As noted, however, the 
executive exercises firm control over NGOs. Two key NGOs in the Family Protection 
initiative – the NCFA (an umbrella organization established in 2001 to coordinate 
governmental and non-governmental agencies working on family affairs) and the JRF – are 
NGOs by Royal Decree (RONGOs). And while some women’s rights groups (for instance the 
JWU and JSPVV) have deliberately kept their distance from royal patronage, most have 
sought out members of the royal family have sought out members of the royal family to be 
their patrons. In interview, a British diplomat previously involved in establishing the FPD 
seemed to support this practice, saying: 
…in general…, if you want to get something done in these hierarchical societies and particularly if it’s 
potentially controversial and people aren’t sure whether they should be doing it, then getting high level 
endorsement is key – because then you create a safe place, where people know they are encouraged to gather 
under that umbrella…. if you had their patronage… you had this general sense of endorsement that helped 
people to engage…. and if you had a problem that you couldn’t unstick through the normal channels, you could 
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go straight to the top to seek their help (Interview with former Deputy Head of Mission for Jordan, Damascus, 
April 2011.) 
RONGOs are exempt from Society Law 58 for 2008 which states that NGOs must obtain 
approval from the Council of Minister for all foreign funding. This enables the executive to 
control the extent to which domestic NGOs can forge partnerships abroad and indeed, 
international sponsors have shown a strong preference for funding RONGOS (Echagüe & 
Michou 2011: 15; Al-Nasser 2016: 7). Moreover, Asma Khader (the SIGI President) 
indicated in 2018 that obtaining foreign funding was becoming increasingly difficult: partly 
because many international NGOs had set up offices in Amman and were seeking to 
implement projects directly without local partners; partly because applying for external 
funding had become complicated and time-consuming, meaning that smaller grassroots 
NGOs were effectively unable to do so, and partly because donor priorities were short term 
and constantly shifting (Telephone interview, 18 July 2018). 
All of these points reinforce the fact that Jordan’s Family Protection Initiative has 
always been primarily shaped by the monarchy. Besides endorsements from Prince Hassan 
and King Abdullah, female members of the royal family play pivotal roles in the Campaign. 
Princess Basma is the President of Jordan Save the Children and the patron of SIGI Jordan. 
She also appointed the founder of Mizan and SIGI Jordan (Asma Kader) to be the Secretary 
General of the JNCW. And Queen Rania is a member of the UNICEF Global Leadership 
Initiative and the founder and patron of the NCFA and JRF.  
The monarchy’s decision to front the Family Protection Initiative enabled it to 
champion the type of women’s rights that Western donors are urging, while regulating civil 
society initiatives that those donors might otherwise seek to patronize directly. In addition to 
controlling domestic NGOs’ access to foreign funding, executive control over civil society 
enables the monarchy to use RONGOs to bypass internal state bureaucracy as well as the 
hostility shown towards the campaign by some of the entrenched elite.  While the FPD is now 
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recognized as a permanent fixture of the PSD, senior police officers in other departments are 
suspicious of it (the FPD’s own external relations officer confirmed as much in interview in 
2012), as are many members of parliament (Jordan Times, 18 April 2017).  
To reduce grounds for criticism, the executive has emphasised the Initiative’s primary 
purpose not as promoting the autonomy of the individual but as preserving the integrity of the 
family unit (which, incidentally, is also one of the stated goals of the Al-‘Afaf Association, a 
charitable organisation pertaining to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood6). Endorsement for 
the Family Protection campaign from the Ministry of Pious Endowments and several 
authoritative religious figures has been key in this respect. Hence, it has always presented the 
campaign’s core objective as the need to protect the family, in which women, as mothers, 
wives, sisters and daughters, play integral roles. According to the NCFA,  
 
The aim is to curb domestic violence and secure a stable environment for all family members in line with the 
religious directives, the cultural heritage and the basic human rights principles (NCFA 2018).  
 
A senior family protection specialist at the NCFA confirmed: 
Our core goal is to protect family unity. Because you know the family in our society has an important place. So 
even in cases of violence we want to bring the family back together as one unit’ (Interview, Amman, July 2013).   
Several Jordanian NGO representatives I spoke to criticized the FPD’s dismissal of cases 
without recourse to the public prosecution because it overstepped their remit. Nonetheless, 
even women’s organizations that provide legal representation to women offered justifications 
for prioritizing family unity: either because they believed in the inherent sanctity of the 
family unit, or that they deemed it necessary to win over public support for taking any 
protective action against abuse, or because they recognized that victims that pursued legal 
action could be socially ostracised, impoverished, and/or subject to revenge attacks from 




Assessing the Opposition: A Clash of Cultures?  
 
Limited uptake of FPD services points to a continued lack of broad-based societal trust in the 
department. A 2012 Jordanian national government survey indicated that roughly 70 per cent 
of Jordanian women believed there are circumstances under which a man is justified in 
beating his wife (DHS 2013: 194). Whether or not women really believe this, the finding is 
indicative of patriarchal attitudes. Political opposition to the family protection initiative – 
voiced in parliament and in public speeches - has not actually been voiced in terms of men’s 
God given right to beat their female family members, but in terms of the state overstepping 
its remit by encroaching in the private sphere of the family, and, crucially, shaming the 
family name.  
Presenting initiatives to protect women (and children) from violence as a bid to 
protect the family appears to have partially reduced opposition. A former spokesperson for 
the IAF (a ‘dove’ rather than a ‘hawk’) told me: 
 
I think the FPD is necessary. Because women and children are often subject to violence and no protection is 
offered to them. Some don’t have tribes [to protect them] - particularly in cities. So the police and the security 
apparatus must have a bigger role in protecting women and helping the weak – you know - children. Many 
families break apart and this is detrimental to children (Interview, Webda, September 2011). 
 
Other political Islamists have proven less sympathetic to the FPD and the Initiative 
more broadly. The woman’s component of the IAF was pointedly excluded from the 
campaign when it was launched 20 years ago. The JNCW and most of the dominant NGOs 
involved in the campaign are strong advocates of CEDAW, and since ratifying the 
Convention in 1997, have pushed for reservations against certain articles to be dropped. The 
28	
	
IAF and the Islamic Centrist Party opposed the ratification and in 2009 initiated a counter-
campaign denouncing CEDAW as a ‘foreign and new occupation tool of the West, which 
amounted to ‘declaring war against Islam’ (Muhtaseb, Brown & Kayyali 2016: 730; Al-
Jazeera Arabic 2009). The two parties argued that Islam teaches gender justice rather than 
equality (Barari & Alatiyat 2010: 363). Their objections to CEDAW cannot be read explicitly 
as an endorsement of domestic abuse: the IAF stated in their 2007 electoral campaign that 
women ‘should enjoy the right to choose their future husbands and the right to marital 
happiness free from coercion and violence’ (Ibid: 376). But their objections to what they 
claim to be foreign interference concerning gender issues are recurrent.  
Besides Islamists’ objections, considerable opposition to the FPD emanates from 
figures who are supposedly closely allied to the monarchy.  During my research on police 
cooperation with community leaders in Jordan, the police put me in touch with a handful of 
tribal representatives across the country with whom they and provincial governors worked 
closely, who took an overtly hostile position. In a rural village in Mafraq, a Bani Hassan 
tribal leader said of the FPD:  
 
Nobodies go to it! Or those who don’t care for their reputation. Because as soon as women go there, their cases 
become public, and their families are shamed. Most women would prefer even marital disputes to be resolved 
within the family, or if need be with intervention by the shaykh who can deal with this sensitively (Interview, 
Rihab, September 2011). 
 
And in an interview with a royally-appointed tribal judge and his son, a civil lawyer, in 
Karak, the son stated hypothetically: 
 
I am a lawyer so I know. A child might go and complain against his father: will that bring the family together? If 
the father gets sent to prison? Or if a wife complains against her husband? Will that bring the family together? 




His father quipped that the FPD would more appropriately be called ‘Tafkik al-Osra’ 
(Breaking up the Family), than Himayat al-Osra (Protecting the Family)!’ A shaykh 
appointed to the royal diwan in a suburb of East Amman told me:  
 
…now women are trying to copy the West and be more individualistic. They’re rebelling – they’re being 
encouraged to inform against their families. We are naturally democratic as God created us. But now this 
Western democracy is invading us. We live honourably and openly… but you have to know where your limits 
are - you can’t just step on other people’s rights and call that democracy (Interview, Marka, July 2011). 
 
Comments by MPs opposed to the passage of the 2017 Law on Domestic Violence convey 
the same type of disapproval of invasive Western influence. One MP from Zarqa province 
commented:  
 
It seems that legislators forgot that we are in Jordan and not in Sweden, and we copy and paste laws without 
being mindful of our identity… I do not deny the presence of domestic violence, but better measures should be 
taken (Jordan Times, April 18, 2017). 
 
Political opposition to the FPD is frequently expressed in terms of its ‘foreignness’ 
even though international agencies have clearly not forced it upon the Kingdom. Criticism of 
foreign interference has, for many years, been a much ‘safer’ avenue of activism than open 
dissent against the executive. Increasingly, however, it appears that hostility for the FPD 
masks resentment against the monarchy based on political exclusion as well as the increasing 
marginalisation of traditional figures of patriarchal authority within society.  Clark & Young 
(2008) argue with respect to Jordanian Islamists’ objections to changes in family law (in 
juxtaposition to Moroccan Islamists’ acceptance of them), that while ideology cannot be 
discounted, the wider political context and the relationship of Islamist political actors with the 
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monarchy and other political actors also plays a significant role. At the same time, 
independent interviews suggested that some East Bankers consider two of the figures most 
closely connected to women’s rights causes, Queen Noor and Queen Rania, as relative 
‘outsiders’ – Noor because of her American nationality, and Rania because of her Palestinian 





Taboos surrounding domestic abuse and moreover state intervention into family 
affairs are scarcely confined to the Middle East, and it is only in recent decades that public 
opinion in Western societies has swung firmly in favour of robust state action. 7  Judging by 
top-down initiatives, Jordan is the regional leader in confronting these taboos. Backed by 
international development agencies, the executive has holistically drawn in government 
ministries and state agencies, as well as co-opting publicly respected religious figures and 
civil society organizations (albeit only those which support its Western-friendly approach) to 
promote a comprehensive programme for providing services to victims, changing the law, 
and attempting to bring the public on board.  And yet, the overall effects have at best been 
ambiguous, and at worst compounded victims’ suffering.   
To some extent, the same barriers exist whenever and wherever the law precedes the 
norm. Attitudes – and vested interests - take time to change; and it is not the intent of this 
article to argue that top-down reform can never be effective. Jordanian women’s fears of 
seeking state intervention against members of their own family are surely not so ‘Otherly’ 
from women everywhere. And, while measures taken in any society to combat abuse of 
women in the home are generally presented within the rubric of women’s empowerment, they 
31	
	
often have paternalistic connotations relating to protecting the weak.  In Jordan, however, as 
in other Western-friendly ‘hybrid regimes’, the executive is substituting democratic reforms 
that would genuinely broaden public access to political decision-making with externally 
sponsored liberal rights initiatives to promote women’s empowerment.  That does not mean 
that its support to women is necessarily cynical, but because it is resisting broader 
democratisation in other spheres, its Family Protection Initiative is strongly influenced by the 
need to co-opt (in the case of women’s groups) and/or circumvent (in the case of tribal 
figures and political Islamists) actors who are pressing for reforms.  
The Hashemite promotion of women’s rights is also integral to its claim that it stands 
behind progressive reform, and therefore represents the West’s best bet for overseeing 
gradual controlled democratisation processes until Jordanian society becomes ‘ready’ for full-
blown democracy.  Divided opinion within the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream 
Islamist groups over women’s status and outright hostility to the ‘foreign’ imposition of 
CEDAW has easily won over Western allies to the monarchy’s case and equally fuelled their 
caution over promoting meaningful democratic reform.   
We cannot know how the campaign might have played out if international actors had 
been willing and able to target interventions more directly through a larger range of 
grassroots actors and organisations including Islamist groups, or had not intervened at all. But 
as it stands, the FPD’s emphasis on reconciling victims with their families reflects the reality 
that the state cannot otherwise guarantee the ongoing safety of victims who seek its 







 The assessment uses four indices measuring economic participation and opportunity, educational 
attainment, health and survival and political empowerment.   
2
 By comparison, in 2017 the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimated that 7.5% of 







 Interview with President of the Jordan Society for Protecting Family Violence Victims (JSPFVV), 
Amman, July 2011. 
 
5
 The FPD releases figures only sporadically, and frequently combines numbers on women and child 
victims.  However, this assessment is based on public reports pertaining to 2004; 2006, 2012 and 
2013 for which the number of cases against women reported to the FPD was 396; 1764, 2100, and 
2104 respectively (NCFA 2008; Al-Rai, May 5, 2017).  
 
6
 See ‘Afaf’s facebook page, at: https://www.facebook.com/alfaf.society/info/?tab=page_info 
 
7
 See, for instance, Carolyn Hoyle’s work on the police intervention into domestic abuse cases in the 
UK in the 1990s (Hoyle, C. 1998, Negotiating domestic violence: Police, criminal justice, and 
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